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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KENNY LEE DOPORTO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040925-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (cases transferred 
from Supreme Court). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue is whether the evidence sufficed to show that defendant used or 
threatened to use his car as a dangerous weapon in the course of committing a 
robbery. The issue is not, as defendant asserts, whether the evidence sufficed to show 
that he intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon. 
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict," the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
and unjust." State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, \ 8, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302 (2003); theft by deception, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (2003); and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (2003). See R53. 
After both parties had rested at trial, defendant moved to "dismiss or at least 
reduce" the aggravated robbery charge. Defendant conceded that the evidence sufficed to 
show the use of force or fear, but asserted that it did not suffice to show the use of a 
dangerous weapon. Rl43:112. The trial court denied the motion, stating "there's an 
issue of fact for the jury's consideration as to whether or not this defendant used the 
vehicle as a dangerous weapon." Id. at 113. 
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of 
drug paraphernalia. R106, 110. The State dismissed the theft by deception charge after a 
witness failed to appear. Rl 11 -13. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five years to 
life on the aggravated robbery conviction and to a concurrent six-month jail term on the 
drug paraphernalia conviction. Rl 16-17. 
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 19. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was on the phone early February 27,2004, "trying to borrow money 
because [he] was starting to get sick from [his] drug addiction and [he] was planning how 
[he] was going to get [his] drugs that day." Rl43:98. A heroin addict, he was "dope 
sick" and "in a hurry." Id. at 99. When he was unable to borrow money, he "drove 
around. .. looking for anything [he] could find to steal,... just to get that fix." Id. at 
100. 
As he was driving, he saw a red truck carrying a compressor. Id. at 100. He 
followed the truck to the parking lot of a flooring business. Id. at 101. After the driver 
exited, defendant pulled his car close to the truck, left the car running, took the 
compressor out of the back of the truck, and threw the compressor on the seat of his car. 
Id. at 102. 
As it turned out, the red truck belonged to Dylan Cole, who worked as an installer 
for his father's flooring business. Id. at 45-46, 51. Dylan carried the air compressor in 
his truck and used it for installations. Id. at 47. Dylan had stopped at the business that 
morning to load some tools. Id. at 46. 
Dylan's father, Eric Cole, was at a computer by a showroom window that morning 
while his son was getting the tools. Id. at 53. Looking through the windows, he saw 
defendant "reach into the back of [his] son's truck and grab a compressor." Id. at 54. As 
defendant carried the compressor to his car, Eric "raced out of the front of the 
showroom . . . to where he was parked." Id. He "went up to the front of the car with 
[his] hand up saying, Hey, stop, wait a minute." Id. He stood directly in front of 
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defendant's car, a "couple of inches from the bumper." Id. at 55. He pounded on the 
driver's side window. Id. at 72. 
Defendant, who was attempting to drive away, looked up and saw Eric. Id. at 55. 
He seemed "shocked that [Eric] was standing right there." Id. Defendant stopped, hit the 
gas again, and stopped again. Id.; see also id. at 73. Eric, seeing that he would either 
have to jump on the hood or be run over, jumped on the hood of defendant's car. Id. at 
55-56. He grabbed onto a little ledge "where the wipers go." Id. at 56. 
Once Eric was on the hood, defendant did not stop again. Id. at 74. Defendant 
accelerated out of the parking lot, drove about 50 feet, and then "did a real quick U-turn 
that threw [Eric] off the car." Id. at 56, 61. Eric sustained minor injuries. Id. at 56. 
After throwing Eric from the car, defendant "sped off." Id. at 62. 
A passer-by saw the incident and followed defendant over twenty blocks. See id. 
at 51, 75-76. He saw defendant stop at one pawn shop, return to his car, and drive to a 
second pawn shop. Id. at 77. The passer-by telephoned the police while he followed 
defendant. Id. at 78, 82. Police met the passer-by and defendant at the second pawn 
shop. Id. at 78, 85. 
Police officers handcuffed and searched defendant. Id, at 85-86. During the 
search they found a needle, a syringe, and a spoon, items that are used together for the 
ingestion of narcotics. Id. at 86-87. 
Defendant told the officers that he had taken the compressor. Id. at 92. Asked 
about the incident with Eric Cole on the hood of his car, defendant said, "I was concerned 
about being caught and I needed my fix." Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To support defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, the State had to present 
evidence to support a finding that defendant used or threatened to use his car as a 
dangerous weapon. The State was not required to show that defendant intended to use his 
car as a deadly weapon. Defendant's claim that the State must show such intent is 
contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute and to Utah case law. 
The State presented evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendant used 
his car as a dangerous weapon. Despite seeing Eric Cole inches in front of the car, 
defendant accelerated toward him, stopped, and then hit the gas again. When Eric 
jumped on the hood to avoid being hit, defendant accelerated out of the parking lot, made 
a quick U-turn, and threw Eric off the car. Evidence of this conduct sufficed to show that 
defendant used the car in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. This, in turn, supported a finding that in so using the car, defendant used a deadly 
weapon during the course of a robbery. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT 
DEFENDANT USED HIS VEHICLE AS A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
Defendant claims that "[t]he State failed to present evidence to support that [he] 
intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon to sustain a conviction for aggravated 
robbery." Br. Appellant at 9. In making his claim, defendant misstates the State's 
burden. To prove robbery, the State must show that defendant knowingly or intentionally 
used force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
To prove aggravated robbery, the State must prove additionally that defendant used or 
threatened to use a dangerous weapon during the course of that robbery. The State need 
not prove that defendant intended to use his vehicle as a dangerous weapon, only that he 
did use it as a dangerous weapon. 
In making any claim "challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a jury 
verdict," defendant "must overcome a heavy burden." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 
136, Tf 10, 2 P.3d 954. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing 
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict," 
the Court "find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was 
so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at f^ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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A. To prove aggravated robbery, the State was required to show that defendant 
used or threatened to use his car as a dangerous weapon, not that he intended 
to use it as a dangerous weapon. 
Defendant states that "the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [he] possessed the requisite mental state to commit the offense." Br. Appellant at 12 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-501(2)(b) (2003)). Defendant then asserts that "[t]he 
mental state required for aggravated robbery is indicated by the inclusion of the word 
'use[d] or threatened] to use.'" Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302). Defendant 
further asserts that "[t]he terms "use[d] or threatened to use' denote[] that a defendant 
must possess an intent to employ an item as a dangerous weapon." Id. Defendant's 
claim is contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute and Utah case law. 
"A person commits robbery if. . . the person intentionally or knowingly uses force 
or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003). An act is considered to be "'in the course of committing a 
theft' if it occurs in . . . commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after 
the . . . commission." Id. 
"A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery, 
he . . . uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). An act is "considered to be 4in the course 
of committing a robbery' if it occurs . . . during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the . . . commission of a robbery." Id. A dangerous weapon includes "any 
Relevant statutes are reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A. 
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item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) 
(2003). 
The statute states that a person commits aggravated robbery if "he uses . . . or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. "Use" is a term 
describing an act, not a mental state. "Use" means to "put into action or service." 
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (version 2.5 CD-ROM 2000). 
"Threaten" is also a term that describes an act. "Threaten" means "to utter threats" or 
"promise punishment." Id. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument in a case 
interpreting an earlier version of the aggravated robbery statute. See State v. Sunniville, 
741 P.2d 961, 962-65 (Utah 1987). The version applicable to Sunniville's crime stated, 
in part, that "A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he . . . [u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id. at 962. The issue in the 
case was "whether [Sunniville] used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm while robbing [a 
credit union]." Id. at 963. The teller testified that Sunniville's "right hand was inside his 
coat pocket which he lifted over the counter." Id. at 962. She stated that while she saw 
no gun, the positioning of Sunniville's hand inside the pocket made it look like he had a 
gun. Id. Further, Sunniville told her, "This is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide. 
Give me all of your money.'" Id. 
The court held that Sunniville had not used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. 
The court stated, "It is obvious that had the Utah Legislature intended for the subjective 
analysis to be used in aggravated robbery cases, it could have written a statute employing 
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language which would admit of that analysis. Instead, the legislature was very precise 
and used language that clearly requires the use of a firearm or a facsimile thereof." Id. at 
964. Thus, the issue was "not what was intended by [Sunniville] or what impression was 
made on the victim, but what was used" Id. (first emphasis added; second in original); 
see also Ward v. State, 2002 WL 1724334, at *4 (Tex App. 2002) (not reported in 
S.W.3d) (attached in Addendum B) (analyzing a Texas statute requiring use of a deadly 
weapon as an element of aggravated robbery and holding that "it was not necessary for 
the jury to find that the defendant intended to use [a Ford] Explorer as a deadly weapon"; 
rather, "it was enough to find the truck was used as a deadly weapon"). 
The current version of the aggravated robbery statute requires a showing that 
defendant "use[d] or threatened] to use a dangerous weapon." "When a court interprets 
an amendment '[t]he legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of terms in 
the original act.5" State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 1A 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30, at 266-67 (5th ed. 1993)). 
Thus, the legislature is presumed to have known that the Utah Supreme Court had 
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interpreted the term "use" to mean an act, not a state of mind, and that it intended that 
meaning when it again employed the term "use" in the current version. 
Thus, the issue for this Court is not whether the evidence supported a jury verdict 
that defendant intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon. Rather, the issue is 
whether the evidence supported a jury verdict that defendant did in fact use his car as a 
dangerous weapon.3 
B. Defendant used his car as a dangerous weapon. 
A dangerous weapon includes "any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). The State has located no Utah authority 
addressing the use of an automobile as a dangerous weapon. 
Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the matter. Most commonly, the 
issue arises in cases of aggravated assault, where the aggravating factor is the use of a 
deadly weapon. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) ("person commits 
The Legislature has not changed the term "use" in the aggravated robbery statute. 
The current version, however, includes a broader definition of the term "dangerous 
weapon." Under the current version, a "dangerous weapon" is "any item capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury" or "a facsimile or representation of the item" 
where "the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious injury" or where "the actor represents 
to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2004). 
3
 Even if defendant's formulation of the issue were correct, the evidence would 
still support a conviction. "A person's state of mind [or intent] is not always susceptible 
of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred from acts, 
conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 10, 988 
P.2d 949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as shown more fully 
below, defendant's acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances are sufficient to support 
a jury verdict that defendant intended to use his car as a dangerous weapon. 
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aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in § 76-5-102 and he . . . uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in § 76-1-601"). While most courts hold that "an 
automobile is not a dangerous or deadly weapon per se," it "appears to be well settled 
that an automobile may be so used as to constitute a dangerous or deadly weapon." 
Automobile as a Dangerous or Deadly Weapon within Meaning of Assault or Battery 
Statute, 89 A.L.R.3d 1026 (2005 electronic update), at § 2[a]. An automobile is "a 
deadly weapon within the meaning of an assault statute when it is used in a manner likely 
to produce death or great bodily harm." Id.; see, e.g., Bogan v. State, 547 S.E.2d 326, 
329 (Ga. App. 2001) (while automobile is not in and of itself a deadly weapon, 
defendant's use of automobile may make it a deadly weapon); Fleming v. State, 987 
S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex. App. 1999) (evidence was sufficient to support finding that 
defendant's vehicle was a "deadly weapon" as defendant's use of the vehicle "was 
'capable' of causing death or serious bodily injury to [another]"); Luck v. Commissioner, 
531 S.E.2d 41, 44 (Va. App. 2000) (motor vehicle, wrongfully used, can be a weapon as 
deadly as a gun or knife). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also addressed the use of an automobile as a 
dangerous weapon in aggravated robbery cases. In Ward v. State, 2002 WL 1724334 
(Tex. App. 2002) (Addendum B), the issue was whether the evidence sufficed to support 
a finding that that an automobile was used as a deadly weapon. Id. at *3-4. The Ward 
victim left a Texas Sam's Club, walked to his Ford Explorer, put the key in the ignition, 
started the engine, and rolled down the electric windows to cool the interior. Id. at * 1. 
After returning his shopping car to the "cart corral," located about ten or fifteen feet way, 
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the victim saw Ward get into the Explorer and back it out of its parking space. Id. When 
the victim "stood in front of the Explorer in an attempt to stop [Ward]," Ward "'floored 
it' and drove quickly out of the parking lot." Id. "The victim moved out of the way of 
the Explorer by putting his hands on the hood and jumping around to the side of the 
vehicle," straining his hip. Id. At trial, Ward "admitted stealing the Explorer but denied 
any intent to run over [the victim] or strike him with the vehicle. Instead, he asserted that 
he was simply trying to flee the scene as quickly as possible." Id. While Ward claimed 
that he did not see the victim, the victim asserted that Ward "maintained eye contact with 
him throughout the incident." Id. 
The appellate court affirmed Ward's conviction. The court reasoned that "[a] 
deadly weapon is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "An instrument that is not a deadly weapon per se 
may qualify as a deadly weapon by (1) the manner of its use or intended use, (2) the 
instrument's size and shape, and (3) the instrument's capacity to produce death or serious 
bodily injury." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the State had presented 
"ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the Explorer, in the manner of its 
use, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. In particular, the 
evidence supported a finding that Ward "saw [the victim] near the vehicle as he exited 
the parking lot and accelerated[,] forcing [the victim] to jump out of the way." Id. 
In State v. Hutchins, 1991 WL 154064 (Ohio App. 1991) (not reported in N.E.2d) 
(attached as Addendum C), the issue again was whether the evidence sufficed to 
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establish that an automobile was a dangerous weapon and therefore to support a 
conviction for aggravated robbery. Id. at *2. The incident involved Hutchins' taking a 
car from a gas station. Id. at * 1. The owner, a mother, had left her son and her keys in 
the car while she entered the station's convenience store. Id. From the store, she saw 
Hutchins get into her car. Id. She ran out and managed to open the passenger door 
before Hutchins could drive away. Id. She attempted to remove the child, but Hutchins 
started the car. Id. She held on to the ridge at the top of the passenger door and 
repeatedly asked Hutchins to give her the baby. Id. Hutchins continued driving, 
dragging the mother about thirty feet. He then stopped suddenly, throwing the mother to 
the ground. Id. Hutchins then backed the car over her legs, stopped, exited the car, 
apologized, and fled. Id. 
The court held that the facts sufficed to show that Hutchins had used the car as a 
deadly weapon. Id. at *3. The court reasoned that the facts were sufficient to support a 
verdict that Hutchins "used the automobile in a manner that was likely to inflict death or 
great bodily harm." Id. Noting that u[t]he determination of whether the automobile was 
used as a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the trier-of-fact," the court held that "the 
known capability of an automobile to kill or maim and the manner in which [Hutchins] 
employed that instrument" were sufficient bases for the jury's determination that 
Hutchins had used the automobile as a deadly weapon for purposes of the aggravated 
robbery statute. Id. 
Here, the evidence sufficed to show that defendant used his car as a deadly 
weapon. The State presented evidence that defendant saw Eric Cole standing directly in 
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front of defendant's car, that defendant nevertheless accelerated his car toward Eric, and 
that defendant stopped and then hit the gas again. R143:53-55. Defendant's actions 
forced Eric to either jump on the hood or be run over. Id. at 55-56. Once Eric was on the 
hood, defendant did not stop, but accelerated out of the parking lot, drove about 50 feet, 
and made a quick U-turn, throwing Eric off the car and causing him minor injuries. Id. at 
56, 61, 74. This evidence sufficed to show that defendant used the car in a manner that 
was capable of causing death or bodily injury. Had Eric not jumped on the car, defendant 
would have hit him straight on. While Eric sustained only minor injuries, he could have 
died or received major injuries, had he landed differently after defendant's quick U-turn 
threw him from the hood. In sum, defendant used the car as a dangerous weapon, and 
the jury properly returned a verdict for aggravated robbery. 
The evidence also sufficed to show that defendant threatened to use his car as a 
deadly weapon. "Threats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as words." 
Ward, 2002 WL 1724334 at *3. The jury could have inferred from defendant's conduct 
after he saw Eric Cole—his accelerating toward Eric, stopping, and then accelerating 
again—that he was communicating a threat to run over Eric if Eric did not get out of the 
way. Cf. id. (holding that jury could reasonably have determined that defendant 
threatened the victim where defendant and victim had eye contact and where defendant 
"suddenly accelerated toward [the victim.] forcing him to jump out of the way"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this J$ day of ^ y a f t ( , 2005. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible 
property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates 
or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
Amended by Chapter 205, 1996 General Session 
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UT ST § 76-6-301 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-301 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 3. ROBBERY 
76-6-301 Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs 
in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-301; 1995, ch. 
222, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection 
(1), which had read "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear," added Subsection (2), 
and redesignated former Subsection (2) as (3). 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" 
if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
NOTICE: NOT DESIGNATED FOR 
PUBLICATION. UNDER TX R RAP RULE 47.7, 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS HAVE NO 
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE BUT MAY BE CITED 
WITH THE NOTATION "(not designated for 
publication)." 
Court of Appeals of Texas, 
Austin. 
Gregory Dywayne WARD, Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE of Texas, Appellee. 
No. 03-02-0G082-CR. 
July 26, 2002. 
Defendant was convicted in the 27th Judicial District 
Court, Bell County, Gordon G. Adams, J., of 
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and jury 
made affirmative deadly weapon finding. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, David Purvear, J., 
held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support 
convictions, and (2) defendant used stolen vehicle as 
deadly weapon. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Automobiles €^>355(14) 
48Ak355(14) Most Cited Cases 
JH Robbery € ^ 2 4 . 5 0 
342k24.50 Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was factually sufficient to prove that 
defendant intentionally or knowingly threatened or 
placed victim in fear of imminent bodily injury or 
death, which thus supported convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault; defendant 
entered victim's vehicle in parking lot, and when 
victim stood in front of vehicle in an attempt to stop 
defendant, defendant "floored it" at victim and drove 
away quickly, injuring victim's hip, and eyewitness 
and defendant both stated they would have felt 
threatened had they been in victim's position. 
V T.C.A., Penal Code S $ 22.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2). 
© 2005 Thomson/West. 
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121 Automobiles €^>355(14) 
48Ak355(14) Most Cited Cases 
121 Robbery €=>24.15(1) 
342k24.15(l) Most Cited Cases 
Sufficient evidence supported jury's affirmative 
finding that stolen motor vehicle was used as "deadly 
weapon," for purposes of aggravated assault and 
aggravated robbery convictions; defendant entered 
victim's vehicle, and when victim stood in front of 
vehicle in an attempt to stop defendant, defendant 
"floored it" at victim, resulting in injury to victim's 
hip. V.T.C.A., Penal Code $ § 1.07(a)(17)(B), 
22.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2). 
From the District Court of Bell County, 27th Judicial 
District, No. 50,938; Gordon G. Adams, Judge 
Presiding. 
Before Justices KIDD, PATTERSON and 
PURYEAR. 
DAVID PURYEAR, Justice. 
*1 A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery 
and aggravated assault. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § § 
29.03(a)(2); 22.02(a)(2) (West 1994). The jury made 
an affirmative finding that the appellant used a 
deadly w eapon in the course of committing the two 
crimes. See Tex.Crim.Code Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, 
3g(a)(2) (West Supp.2002); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. $ 
508.145(d) (West Supp.2002). The trial court 
assessed punishment at forty years in prison and a 
$10,000 fine. Appellant brings three points of error 
challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his convictions. We will affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on June 28, 1999, John 
Watts left the Sam's Club in Temple, and walked to 
his vehicle, a Ford Explorer. Watts put the key in the 
ignition of his Explorer, started the engine, and rolled 
down the electric windows in an effort to cool off the 
interior of the vehicle. After he loaded his groceries 
into the back of the Explorer, Watts returned his 
shopping cart to the "cart corral" located 
approximately ten to fifteen feet away from his 
vehicle. As Watts returned to the. Explorer, he saw 
appellant get into it and back it out of the parking 
space. Watts then stood in front of the Explorer in an 
attempt to stop appellant. Appellant then "floored it" 
and drove quickly out of the parking lot. Watts 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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moved out of the way of the Explorer by putting his 
hands on the hood and jumping around to the side of 
the vehicle. Watts strained his hip as a result. The 
incident was estimated to have taken between five 
and twenty seconds. Appellant was arrested 
approximately two and a half weeks later on July 16, 
1999. 
At trial, appellant admitted stealing the Explorer but 
denied any intent to run over Watts or strike him with 
the vehicle. Instead, he asserted that he was simply 
trying to flee the scene as quickly as possible. 
Appellant stated further that he did not see Watts in 
front of the Explorer because the incident occurred so 
quickly. Watts asserted that appellant maintained eye 
contact with him throughout the incident and that he 
felt that if he had not moved out of the way, appellant 
would have run him over. A witness at the scene 
stated that he would have felt threatened in the 
situation, and that there was no indication that the 
driver of the Explorer had any intention of stopping 
to avoid hitting Watts. In addition, a police officer 
testified that a motor vehicle can be used as a deadly 
weapon. 
Appellant brings three points of error on appeal: (1) 
the evidence is factually insufficient to support the 
finding of guilt of the offense of aggravated 
robbery with a deadly weapon, (2) the evidence is 
factually insufficient to support the finding of guilt of 
the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to show 
that the automobile was, in the manner and means of 
its use, a deadly weapon. 
DISCUSSION 
The Factual Sufficiency Standard of Review 
*2 In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the 
evidence, we begin with the presumption that the 
evidence supporting the judgment is legally 
sufficient. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 
(Tex.Crim.App.1996). The court reviews the 
evidence presented to the jury both tending to prove 
and disprove the elemental fact. Jones v. State, 944 
S.W.2d 642. 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The 
reviewing court views all the evidence in a neutral 
light, and sets aside the verdict "only if it is so 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis, 922 
S.W.2d at 129; see also Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 
1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2QQ0). 
The appellate court may disagree with the fact 
finder's determination, but its review must employ 
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No 
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appropriate deference to prevent substituting its 
judgment for that of the fact finder. Johnson, 23 
S.W.3d at 7. Further, the examination should not 
substantially intrude on the fact finder's role as the 
sole judge of the weight and credibility given to 
witness testimony. Id. The degree of deference a 
reviewing court provides must be proportionate with 
the facts it can accurately glean from the trial record. 
Id. at 8. Unless the record clearly demonstrates that a 
different result is appropriate, an appellate court must 
defer to the jury's determination concerning what 
weight to give contradictory testimonial evidence 
because resolution frequently hinges on an evaluation 
of credibility and demeanor, and the jurors were in 
attendance when the testimony was delivered. Id. 
Moreover, it is not enough to support a finding of 
factual insufficiency that an equally plausible 
alternative to the jury's determination exists. 
Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285 
(Tex.Crim.App.2001). The existence of some 
evidence contrary to the outcome is acceptable. It is 
only when the conviction ignores the great weight 
and preponderance of contrary evidence that the 
verdict should be set aside. Id. 
The Intent Element 
£11A party commits the offense of robbery if, in the 
course of committing theft and with the intent to 
obtain or maintain control of property, he 
intentionally or knowingly threatens or places 
another in fear of irnminent bodily injury or death. 
See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (West 1994). 
If a person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during 
the commission of a robbery, the offense becomes an 
aggravated robbery. Id. § 29.03(a)(2). 
Assault occurs when a person intentionally or 
knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily 
injury. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2) (West 
Supp.2002). The offense becomes an aggravated 
assault if it is committed using a deadly weapon. Id. § 
22.02(a)(2) (West 1994). 
The question raised by appellant in his first two 
issues is whether the evidence offered by the State 
was factually sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he intentionally or knowingly threatened 
or placed Watts in fear of imminent bodily injury or 
death. The resolution of this issue hinged on the 
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses at trial, 
including the appellant who testified in his own 
behalf. Appellant testified that he did not intend to 
threaten Watts, while Watts and an eyewitness 
testified that they believed appellant knew of Watts's 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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presence in the parking lot and intended to accelerate 
in his direction. On direct and redirect examination, 
Watts testified as follows: 
*3 Q: Did you happen to see where [appellant] was 
looking as you were standing in front of the 
vehicle, pointing your finger at him? 
A: He was watching me closely. As he got in the 
vehicle his eyes were on me.... And he got in and 
he never took his eyes off me. 
Q: How about when you were standing in front of 
the vehicle? 
A: He looked me right in the eye. 
Q: Now as you stood in front of your vehicle and 
pointed the finger at this individual making eye 
contact with him, what happened next? 
A: He pulled her down into drive and stood on it. 
Q: What do you mean by "stood on it"? 
A: He floored it. 
* * * 
Q: Do you believe this individual intended to hit 
you with the vehicle? 
A: Yes, I think he would have run over me if I 
hadn't been able to get out of the way. 
An eyewitness, Carlos Brooks, testified that he 
would have felt threatened had he been in Watts's 
position. When asked how fast the appellant drove 
the Explorer towards Watts, Brooks replied that it 
was fast enough that he would have gotten out of the 
way. The appellant admitted that he jumped into 
Watts's vehicle with the intent to steal it, but denied 
any intent to use the Explorer as a weapon or to harm 
Watts in any way. He asserted that he was not the 
type of man who would harm another individual 
intentionally, and said he was only trying to flee the 
scene as quickly as possible. However, he admitted 
he would have felt threatened under the same 
circumstances. 
Threats may be communicated by action or conduct 
as well as words. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 
355, 357 fTex.Crim.App.1984). A neutral review of 
the evidence reveals that the jury could reasonably 
find that appellant intentionally or knowingly 
threatened Watts. Appellant admitted that he floored 
the vehicle, that he saw Watts near the car as he 
exited the parking lot, and that he would have felt 
threatened under the same circumstances. This 
coupled with testimony by the victim and the 
eyewitness that appellant suddenly accelerated 
toward Watts forcing him to jump out of the way and 
that appellant maintained eye contact with Watts 
throughout the incident was sufficient to outweigh 
the evidence to the contrary, which consisted solely 
of appellant's testimony that he did not intend to 
threaten Watts. At best, appellant offers only an 
equally plausible alternative version of the facts that 
the jury chose not to believe. Therefore, the verdict 
was not so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as 
to be unjust. We overrule appellant's first and second 
points of error. 
Motor Vehicle as Deadly Weapon 
[2] In his third point of error, appellant contends that 
the evidence adduced at trial was factually 
insufficient to support the jury's affirmative finding 
that he used the Explorer as a deadly weapon. [FN 11 
Appellant claims he used the Explorer simply to 
effect his escape and that he had no specific intent to 
threaten, hurt, or kill Watts with the Explorer. 
FN1. "Deadly weapon" means: 
(A) a firearm or anything manifestly 
designed, made, or adapted for the purpose 
of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; 
or 
(B) anything that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. 
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07fa)q7) (West 
1994). 
*4 A deadly weapon is "anything that in the manner 
of its use or intended use is capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury." Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 
L07fa)q7)fB) (West 1994) (emphasis added). An 
instrument that is not a deadly weapon per se may 
qualify as a deadly weapon by (1) the manner of its 
use or intended use, (2) the instrument's size and 
shape, and (3) the instrument's capacity to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. Garza v. State, 695 
S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985X affd, 725 
S.W.2d 256 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). To establish use 
of a deadly weapon, the State is not required to prove 
the weapon used actually caused death or serious 
bodily injury. See Brooks v. State, 900 S.W.2d 468, 
472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, no pet.). Rather, the 
State must show the weapon was capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 472. At trial, the 
police officer who arrested appellant, testified that in 
her experience an automobile could be used as a 
deadly weapon; thus, the State produced evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably infer that the 
Explorer was capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. There was also ample evidence from 
which the jury could infer that the Explorer, in the 
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manner of its use, was capable of causing death or 
serious b odily injury. Appellant saw W arts n ear the 
vehicle as he exited the parking lot and accelerated 
forcing Watts to jump out of the way. 
The issue of whether a jury must find that a 
defendant intended to use the motor vehicle 
as a deadly weapon was addressed by the 
court of criminal appeals in Walker v. State, 
897 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), in 
which the court construed "deadly weapon" 
as it appears in article 42.12, section 
3g(a)(2) of the code of criminal procedure. 
[FN2") In that case, the defendant argued 
against the jury's affirmative finding that he 
used his vehicle as a deadly weapon because 
he was charged with involuntary 
manslaughter resulting from his operation of 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, thus, 
there was no evidence he operated his car 
with intent to cause the decedent's death. In 
addressing appellant's claim, the court of 
criminal appeals relied on Patterson v. State, 
769 S.W.2d 938. 940-941 
(Tex.Crim. App. 1989), concerning the 
meaning of "use": 
FN2. Article 42.12, section 3g(a)(2) provides: 
The provisions of Section 3 of this article do 
not apply: 
(2) to a defendant when it is shown that a 
deadly weapon as defined in Section 1.07, 
Penal Code, was used or exhibited during 
the commission of a felony offense or 
during immediate flight therefrom, and that 
the defendant used or exhibited the deadly 
weapon or was a party to the offense and 
knew that a deadly weapon would be used or 
exhibited. 
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann, art. 42.12, § 
3gfaV2) (West 2002). 
"Use" as a verb, may mean a number of things. For 
example, "use" is defined as 'to put into action or 
service: have recourse or enjoyment of: employ ... 
to carry out a purpose or action by means of: make 
instrumental to an end or process: apply to 
advantage: turn to account: utilize'.... In explicating 
the word the dictionary provides the following 
synonym [sic] 'employ, utilize, apply, avail: use is 
general and indicates putting to service of a thing, 
usu. for an intended or fit purpose....'" 
Id. Based on this analysis, the court reasoned that 
Page 4 
when there is no clear intent to harm or kill, the 
meaning of "use" is open to the broadest possible 
interpretation. Walker, 897 S.W.2d at 814. For 
example, use of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of a felony offense refers not only to the 
actual wielding of a firearm but also extends to any 
employment of a deadly weapon, including mere 
possession, if such possession facilitates the 
commission of the associated felony. Patterson, 769 
S.W.2d at 941. Therefore, the Walker court held that 
no intent to use the automobile as a deadly w eapon 
was required; rather, "an object may be used as a 
deadly weapon where the 'manner of its use ... is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.' " 
Walker, 897 S.W.2d at 814 (quoting definition of 
"deadly weapon" in section 1.07 of the penal code): 
see also Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 
(Tex.Crim. App. 1995). This Court expressed the same 
view in Roberts v. State, 766 S.W.2d 578, 579 
(Tex.App.-Austin 3 989. no pet). In that case, we 
held that the reckless operation of a truck, with an 
awareness of, but conscious disregard for, a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that injuries to 
another would result, was enough to find the truck 
was used as a deadly weapon. Id. Thus, we hold it 
was not necessary for the jury to find that the 
defendant intended to use the Explorer as a deadly 
weapon. JTN3] 
FN3. We note that in an earlier case 
involving possession of a prohibited 
weapon, the court of criminal appeals held 
that in order for an object to qualify as a 
deadly weapon for affirmative finding 
purposes, the weapon must be utilized to 
achieve an intended result, namely, the 
commission of a felony offense. Narron v. 
State, 835 S.W.2d 642, 644 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992). There was ample 
evidence in this case that appellant used the 
Explorer to commit a felony offense. 
*5 The jury's determination that the Explorer was, in 
the manner of its use, a deadly weapon is not against 
the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we 
hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to 
support appellant's conviction. We overrule 
appellant's third point of error. 
CONCLUSION 
Having overruled all appellant's points o f error, w e 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
2002 WL 1724334 (Tex.App.-Austin) 
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CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas 
County. 
STATE of Ohio, Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas HUTCHINS, Appellant. 
No. L 90-182. 
Aug. 9,1991. 
Anthony G. Pizza, Prosecuting Attorney and Joseph 
J. Solomon, for appellee. 
Fritz Byers, for appellant. 
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 
*1 This case is before the court on appeal from a 
judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 
Pleas, Criminal Division. Appellant, Thomas L. 
Hutchins, was found guilty of one count of 
aggravated robbery, a violation of R.C. 
2911.0KA)fl), with a physical harm specification; 
one count of unlawful restraint, a violation of R.C. 
2905.03; and one count of negligent assault, a 
violation of R.C. 2903.14. Appellant appeals his 
convictions and sets forth the following assignments 
of error: 
" 1 . THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL BY 
THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
"2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND UNLAWFUL 
RESTRAINT WHICH, UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE, ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF 
SIMILAR IMPORT. 
"3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY TO 
BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE, BECAUSE THE STATE'S 
THEORY OF GUILT IMPERMISSIBLY 
UNDERMINES LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
REGARDING THE CODIFICATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW IN OHIO." 
This case arises from the following pertinent facts. 
On January 18, 1990, Loretta L. Sparks drove to the 
Fuel Mart on Byrne Road in Toledo, Lucas County, 
Ohio, to purchase a pack of cigarettes. Loretta's 
three month old son, Justin, was in a child restraint 
seat and buckled into the front passenger seat of the 
automobile. 
Loretta pulled into the Fuel Mart at approximately 
7:30 p.m. and parked close to the door of the gas 
station/convenience mart with the passenger door of 
her automobile parallel to and adjacent to the door of 
the station. She left her son and her keys in the car. 
Just after she purchased her cigarettes and was 
turning to leave, the clerk, Dawn R. Jones, said, 
"Your car." Loretta turned and saw a man getting 
into her car. She ran out of the station and managed 
to open the passenger door before the man could 
drive away. 
Sparks attempted to remove her child from the car 
seat, but the man started the automobile. Sparks 
held on to the car by the ridge at the top of the 
passenger door and repeatedly requested that she be 
given her baby. Sparks was dragged, hanging on to 
the side of the car, for approximately thirty feet. As 
he approached Byrne Road, the driver suddenly 
stopped the car. Sparks was thrown to the ground and 
landed with her legs under the car behind the rear 
wheel on the passenger side. The driver then backed 
the rear tire over Sparks' legs and stopped. He exited 
the automobile, came around to the passenger side, 
apologized to Sparks, and fled on foot. Sparks was 
admitted to the hospital for the injuries to her legs. 
She and Jones subsequently identified appellant as 
the person who was in the automobile on the evening 
of January 18, 1990. 
On January 30, 1990, the grand jury returned a three 
count indictment charging appellant with aggravated 
robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault. All three 
counts included a specification of physical harm. 
Appellant never filed a motion to dismiss any of the 
counts of the indictment or voiced any objection to 
the fact that he was charged with aggravated robbery. 
Appellant's defense was premised upon the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony and his alleged 
alibi. 
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*2 A jury trial was held on April 9, 1990. At that 
trial, Loretta Sparks testified as to the facts set forth 
above. Dawn Jones testified that she saw a man, 
whom she identified as appellant, get into Sparks' 
automobile. She further stated that appellant placed 
his hand on Justin as he was entering the driver's side 
of the car. Jones also described the same sequence 
of events as testified by Sparks. Laurie Robinson 
testified on behalf of appellant and stated that 
appellant and some other friends were in her 
apartment between 5:30 p.m. and approximately 9:00 
p.m. on January 18, 1990. 
The trial court instructed the jury as tor among other 
things, the elements of kidnapping and the lesser 
included offense of unlawful restraint; aggravated 
robbery under R.C. 2911.0KA)q) and the lesser 
included offense of grand theft of a motor vehicle; 
felonious assault and the lesser included offense of 
negligent assault; and the physical harm 
specifications. Appellant's objections to these 
instructions related to the wording of certain portions 
of the instructions and to the fact that the trial court 
rejected appellant's request for a charge on the lesser 
included offense of petty theft. 
The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated 
robbery and the physical harm specification included 
with this count and of the lesser included offenses of 
unlawful restraint and negligent assault. Appellant 
was sentenced on May 18, 1990. This timely appeal 
followed. 
In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that 
the jury verdict of guilty on the charged offense of 
aggravated robbery was against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. 
As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. 
Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305. at 313: 
"In State v. Elev H978). 56 Ohio St.2d 169. at the 
syllabus, this court held '[a] reviewing court will not 
reverse a jury verdict where there is substantial 
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably 
conclude that all of the elements of an offense have 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt' Therefore, 
in reviewing a claim that a jury verdict was against 
the manifest weight of the evidence or that the 
evidence was insufficient, a reviewing court's duty is 
to review the record to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
In the instant case, appellant could be convicted of 
aggravated robbery only if the prosecution offered 
sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that appellant, in committing or attempting a 
theft offense as defined in R.C. 2913.PL or in fleeing 
immediately thereafter, had a deadly weapon or 
dangerous ordnance on or about his person or under 
his control R.C. 2911.01fAVn. 
Appellant alleges that insufficient evidence was 
adduced to establish that the automobile was a deadly 
weapon. In reaching this conclusion appellant first 
points out that the finding of guilty on the charged 
offense of aggravated robbery is inconsistent with the 
jury's verdict on count three of the indictment, 
felonious assault. The jury acquitted appellant of the 
charged offense of felonious assault but found him 
guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent 
assault. Appellant asserts that by finding that his 
actions with respect to the automobile were negligent 
the jury indicated that appellant did not "knowingly" 
use the automobile as a deadly weapon. Appellant 
claims that if his actions with regard to the 
automobile were not "knowing" or "intentional", the 
automobile could not be deemed a deadly weapon. 
In essence, appellant argues that in order for the jury 
to conclude the automobile was a deadly weapon 
they were required to first conclude that appellant 
had the specific intent to inflict physical harm on 
Loretta Sparks. 
*3 R.C. 2923.11(A) defines a deadly weapon as: 
" * * * any instrument, device, or thing capable of 
inflicting death, and designed or specifically adapted 
for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as 
a weapon." 
This definition is incorporated into several statutes 
which set forth criminal offenses, for example, R.C. 
2903.11. felonious assault; R.C. 2911.01. aggravated 
robbery; R.C. 2911.11. aggravated burglary; R.C. 
2903.14. negligent a ssault. Each of these o ffenses 
consist of several elements, including intent. The 
addition of the element of a "deadly weapon" does 
not transform the requisite intent in each statute to 
that of "knowingly" or "intentional." If appellant's 
proposition were accepted an accused could not be 
convicted of negligent assault unless it could be 
demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he or 
she had "knowingly" or "intentionally" employed an 
instrumentality to cause physical harm to another. 
This contradicts the express language of R.C. 
2903.14(A) which requires that the evidence need 
only establish that negligence in the use of the deadly 
weapon caused physical harm. We therefore reject 
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any notion that the determination of an 
instrumentality as being a deadly weapon must be 
premised upon a finding that the instrument or device 
was knowingly or intentionally employed to harm the 
victim. Rather, we shall review the evidence offered 
in light of the standard set forth below. 
While some instruments or devices, e.g., a firearm, 
are termed deadly weapons per se, others are not. 
State v. Orlett (1975), 44 Ohio Misc. 7, 9. The test of 
whether an instrumentality is a deadly weapon rests 
upon its capability to inflict death or great bodily 
harm. Id. The manner in which the instrument is 
used and its nature determine its capability to inflict 
death or great bodily harm. State v. Devoe (1977), 
62 Ohio App.2d 194. Therefore, it is well-
established that in cases where an automobile is used 
in a manner likely to produce great bodily harm or 
death, an automobile can be determined to be a 
deadly weapon. Orlett, supra, at 10; State v. 
Allender (Dec. 5, 1990), Muskingham App. No. CA-
90-11, unreported; State v. Davidson (June 20, 
1990), Lorain App. No. 89-CA-004641, unreported; 
State v. Townsend (Feb. 22, 1990), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 56571, unreported. The determination of 
whether the automobile was used as a deadly weapon 
is a question of fact for the trier-of-fact. Orlett, 
supra, at 9. 
The record of the present case reveals appellant was 
fully aware of the fact that Loretta Sparks was 
hanging onto the roof on the passenger side of the 
automobile and imploring him to give her the baby. 
Despite this fact, appellant moved the car forward for 
approximately thirty feet and stopped suddenly, 
thereby throwing Sparks to the ground. Although a 
likelihood that Sparks would be near or under the 
vehicle existed, appellant then put the automobile 
into reverse and moved backwards mnning over 
Sparks legs in the process. These are sufficient facts 
upon which a jury could conclude that appellant used 
the automobile in a manner that was likely to inflict 
death or great bodily h arm. Any specific interit to 
injure or kill did not have to be demonstrated. While 
intent may be considered by a trier-of-fact as one 
factor among many, see Orlett, supra, the known 
capability of an automobile to kill or maim and the 
manner in which appellant employed that instrument 
are the bases for the jury's determination. 
Accordingly, the jury could decide upon the evidence 
offered that the automobile was a deadly weapon for 
the purposes of both R.C. 2901.11(A)(1) and R.C. 
2903.14. Appellant's first assignment of error is 
found not well-taken. 
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*4 Appellant, in his second assignment of error, 
contends that aggravated robbery and unlawful 
restraint are allied offenses of a similar import. He, 
therefore, claims that, pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A), 
he could be charged with both offenses but convicted 
of only one. 
R.C. 2941.25 reads, in full: 
"(A) Where the s ame c onduct by defendant c an b e 
construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of 
similar import, the indictment or information may 
contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant 
may be convicted of only one. 
"(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two 
or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his 
conduct results in two or more offenses of the same 
or similar kind committed separately or with a 
separate animus as to each, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, 
and the defendant may be convicted of all of them." 
In d etermining whether ana ccused i s c harged with 
allied offenses of similar import a court must apply a 
two-tiered test. State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 116, 117. First, the court must compare the 
two crimes. If the elements of the crimes correspond 
to such a degree that the commission of one crime 
will result in the commission of the other, the crimes 
are allied offenses of similar import. Id. The second 
step involves a review of the defendant's conduct. If 
the court can conclude that the crimes were 
committed separately or that a separate animus 
existed for each crime, the defendant may be 
convicted of both offenses. Id. 
In State v. Logan (1979). 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio noted that the crime of 
robbery, by its very n ature, involves restraint of the 
victim. Therefore, in following Logan, supra, the 
Montgomery Court of Appeals found kidnapping and 
robbery to be allied offenses of similar import. State 
v Parker (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 128, 130. 
Unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of 
kidnapping. Committee Comments to HB-511, Ohio 
Rev.Code Ann. $ 2905.03 (Page 1987). Thus, we 
shall assume for the purposes of our discussion that 
unlawful restraint and aggravated robbery can be 
allied offenses of a similar import. 
Appellant assumes that both of the offenses charged 
were motivated by a single purpose and rely upon 
identical conduct and the same evidence. See State 
v. Donald (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 75. If such 
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were true, appellant could not be convicted of both 
charged offenses. Id. Nevertheless, we conclude that 
the charges are founded upon separate conduct 
provable by different evidence and, therefore, have 
separate animi, purpose or immediate motive. The 
evidence supporting the conviction for aggravated 
robbery consists of appellant's conduct toward 
Loretta Sparks in that he attempted to deprive her of 
the ownership of her automobile and in doing so fled 
and used that automobile as a deadly weapon. The 
evidence supporting the unlawful restraint conviction 
consisted of appellant's conduct toward Justin Sparks 
in that he placed his hand on the child and did not 
allow the child's removal from the automobile. 
Thus, we have separate forms of conduct towards two 
different victims based upon separate evidence. 
Accordingly, the charged offenses were committed 
separately with a separate animus for each. 
Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, 
appellant could be convicted of both aggravated 
robbery and unlawful restraint. Appellant's second 
assignment of error is found not well-taken. 
*5 In his third assignment of error, appellant 
maintains that the trial court erred in submitting the 
charge of aggravated robbery to the jury because 
permitting the state to indict and convict him of that 
offense violates the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers. Appellant also asserts that 
allowing the charge and conviction for aggravated 
robbery to stand effectively repeals a portion of R.C. 
2913.02, automobile theft, a felony of a third degree, 
because it permits the state to charge all persons who 
are accused of the theft of an automobile and flee in 
that automobile to be charged with aggravated 
robbery. 
This issue was never raised in the court below. 
Errors which are neither raised nor reached by the 
lower court will not be passed upon by an appellate 
court. State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 27. 
28 (citations omitted). The doctrine of waiver of 
error also applies to any constitutional issue. State v. 
Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 124. Hence, this 
court need not address the issues in appellant's third 
assignment of error. We note, however, that under 
the narrow facts of the case at bar, the charge and 
conviction for aggravated robbery did not constitute 
judicial legislation or violate the legislature's intent in 
enacting two separate statutes for the offenses of 
aggravated robbery and automobile theft. 
Appellant's third assignment of error is found not 
well-taken. 
On consideration whereof, this court finds that 
appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from 
having a fair trial, and the judgment of the Lucas 
County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, 
is affirmed. Costs of this appeal assessed to 
appellant. 
HANDWORK, P.J., and MELVIN L. RESNICK and 
SHERCK, JJ., concur. 
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